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"I AIN'T GONNA WORK ON MAGGIE'S FARM NO
MORE:" INSTITUTIONAL SEGREGATION,
COMMUNITY TREATMENT, THE ADA, 1 AND THE
PROMISE OF OLMSTEAD v. L.C 2
MICHAEL L. PERLIN3
I. INTRODUCTION
If you are of a certain age, there is a fairly good chance that you
remember, perhaps hazily, perhaps with pinpoint accuracy, the day that
Bob Dylan plugged in his guitar and changed the course of rock 'n roll
forever.4 Now, it is true that I have been accused by some otherwise
very good friends of being a bit too Dylan-centric, a charge to which I
gleefully demur. But even if this allegation has a soupcon of truth, the
point is an important one. Dylan's decision to abandon (or at least,
radically transform) the folk music tradition and replace it with a new
sort of literary, poetic, angry, passionate, lyrical rock music truly
revolutionized popular culture.' For those of you fortunate enough to
have seen him in recent years, that revolution continues.6
Why do I start this way (other than the obvious, which is that I really
enjoy talking about him)? Well, there are two interlocking reasons.
First, I believe that the United States Supreme Court's decision in June
of 1999 in Olmstead v. L.C.7 and the impact of the Americans With
I. The ADA, mentioned throughout the paper, refers to the Americans With Disabilities
Act, which can be found at 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 (West 1995). This paper was presented on
October 30, 1999, at Thomas M. Cooley Law School's Symposium on Mental Disability Law.
Portions of this paper are adapted from MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL
DIsABILrrY ON TRIAL (2000).
2. 119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999).
3. Professor of Law, New York Law School. J.D., Columbia University School of Law;
A.B., Rutgers University. The author wishes to thank Jennifer Burgess, Christine Morton, and
Jenna Anderson for their invaluable research help, and Michael Feuerstein for bringing him
back into the world of Bob Dylan's music.
4. See The DYLAN COMPANION: A COLLECTION OF EsSENTIAL WRITING ABOUT BOB
DYLAN 15-16 (Elizabeth Thompson & David Gutman eds. 1990); TiM RILEY, HARD RAIN: A
DYLAN COMMENTARY 116-17 (1992); WANTED MAN: IN SEARCH OF BOB DYLAN 57-66 (David
Bauldie ed. 1990).
5. See, e.g., RILEY, supra note 4, at 4-27.
6. Readers of this article are cordially invited to visit me in my New York office. My
door now is festooned with the set lists of the last twelve Dylan concerts I've attended (from
November 1994, at Roseland in New York City, to November 1999, at the Meadowlands Arena
in East Rutherford, NJ).
7. 119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999).
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Disabilities Act' on persons institutionalized by reason of mental
disability9 has the capacity to be as legally revolutionary as Dylan's
decision to alter his performance style thirty-four years ago was
culturally revolutionary (although I am, frankly, not at all certain that
this will be so). Second, when Dylan did go electric, one of the first
songs came from his famous Bringing It All Back Home album,
Maggie's Farm.'0
Maggie's Farm, like most of Dylan's important songs from this
period, was not without its ambiguities. Critics have variously
suggested that it is a metaphor for slavery and/or plantation life, for the
ravages of Darwinian capitalism, for the oppression of family life, and
for the suffocation of the human spirit." Who knows which one, if any,
is right? Bob sure has not told us. 2 We do know that Maggie's Farm
has had a remarkable shelf life. Bob has sung it some 563 times on his
current extended series of tours, most recently on July 30, 1999, at Jones
Beach, NY.13
I tell you all this-trust me, it really is not as self-indulgent as it may
8. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 (West 1995).
9. See generally PERLIN, supra note 1; MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL (1998, 1999 & 1999 Cum. Supp.).
10. Probably Dylan's most controversial early electric performance was at the Newport
Folk Festival on July 25, 1965. See Joe Boyd, Newport '65, in WANTED MAN, supra note 4,
at 64 ("[B]y [the musical standards of 1965, Maggie's] was the loudest thing that anybody had
ever heard."). See, e.g., RILEY, supra note 4, at 116-17. Maggie's was the first electrified song
that he sang that afternoon.
This will be my last burst of self-referentiality. I may have seen Bob sing Maggie's at a
concert at Rutgers University in April 1965 (my memory is good, but not that good). In recent
years, I've heard him sing it three times: Roseland in New York City in 1994, the Electric
Factory in Philadelphia in 1995, and Irving Place in New York City in December 1997. I
expect that there will be future times as well.
11. See, e.g., Andrew Muir, Detailed Study of Maggies [sic] Farm, (visited Oct. 8, 1999)
<http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Forum/2667/maggiesf.html>; RILEY, supra note 4, at 105
("'Maggie's Farm' is a list of complaints, from everyday chores and employer hassles to
bureaucratic oppression." The song's opening line- "I ain't gonna work on Maggie's Farm
no more"--has been used epigrammatically to illustrate academicians' adoption of Critical
Legal Studies as "Urban Guerrilla Warfare" in David Fraser, IfI Had a Rocket Launcher:
Critical Legal Studies as Moral Terrorism, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 777, 789 (1990)).
12. On the unexplained ambiguity in Dylan's lyrics, see ROBERT SHELTON, No DIRECTION
HorE: THE LIFE AND MUSIC OF BOB DYLAN 306-39 (Da Capo ed. 1997). The song title may
have come from Silas Magee's Farm in Greenwood, Mississippi, where Dylan, on July 6, 1963,
played his early civil rights anthem, Only a Pawn in Their Game, at a civil rights rally. See also
Greenwood Mississippi Rally, (visited Oct. 11, 1999)
<http://www.punkhart.com/dylan/tapes/63-jul6.html>. See generally Muir, supra note 11.
13. See Bill Pagel, Bob Dylan's 1999 Summer Tour Guide, (visited Oct. 15, 1999)
<http://www.execpc.com/-billp61/073099s.html>.
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seem-because, when I read Olmstead and spent some time thinking
about it, Maggie's Farm popped immediately into my mind. In her
brilliant, Pulitzer Prize-winning report on life at Creedmoor Psychiatric
Hospital in New York City, Is There No Place on Earth For Me?, 4
Susan Sheehan wrote carefully and thoughtfully about the regime of a
then-recently-retired Creedmoor Superintendent who ran Creedmoor
like a plantation, and treated Creedmoor staff like plantation workers
(even to the grotesque length of calling African-Americans "darkies"). 5
When I first read Sheehan's book, 6 the "plantation" metaphor jumped
out at me, and resonated with so many of my experiences as a lawyer
representing patients at New Jersey mental hospitals from the mid 1970s
to the early 1980s, and with observations that I had made over the years
at mental hospitals in other states across the country. The sagas of right-
to-treatment cases such as Wyatt v. Stickney, 7 or right-to-refuse-
treatment cases such as Rennie v. Klein,' bespoke a plantation
mentality, often on the parts of both the keepers and the kept. 9
So, when I first read Olmstead,' one of the images that immediately
14. SUSAN SHEEHAN, Is THERE NO PLACE ON EARTH FOR ME? (Vintage ed. 1983).
15. See id. at 13.
16. 1 have been assigning it to my Mental Health Law students yearly since 1985, so I have
probably re-read it more than any other book in my lifetime.
17. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (subsequent citations omitted).
A few of the atrocious incidents cited in [the supplementing] case include the following:
(a) a resident was scalded to death by hydrant water; (b) a resident was restrained in a
straitjacket for nine years in order to prevent hand and finger sucking; (c) a resident was
inappropriately confined in seclusion for a period of years; and (d) a resident died from
the insertion by another resident of a running water hose into his rectum. Each of these
incidents could have been avoided had adequate staff and facilities been available[.]
344 F. Supp. 387, 393-94 n.13 (M.D. Ala. 1972); see 2 PERLIN, supra note 9, § 3A-3.1 at 24-32
(2d ed. 1999).
18. 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978) (subsequent citations omitted).
On November 17, 1977, plaintiff reported that evening shift attendants beat him with
sticks while he was tied to a bed. The next day he pointed out the sticks, which were
hidden at the nurses' station. The investigation that followed resulted in the suspension
of one employee for three days. Plaintiff and the attendant remained together in the same
ward.
Id. at 136. See generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 9, § 3B-5.1 at 190-91 (2d ed. 1999).
19. See generally Rennie, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.
Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972); and Wyatt, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
20. I should point out that I have never been to Georgia Regional Hospital in Atlanta, the
facility in which L.C. and her co-plaintiff, E.W., were housed. To the best of my knowledge,
it has never been the subject of litigation over patients' conditions of confinement. But see
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (discussing the constitutionality of Georgia's juvenile
commitment statutes). My intuition, however, from reading a range of cases about Georgia
Regional Hospital in which other issues (malpractice, see, e.g., Davis v. State, 439 S.E.2d 40
20001
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came to my mind was Dylan singing, snarling:
I ain't gonna work on Maggie's farm no more.
No, I ain't gonna work on Maggie's farm no more.
Well, I wake in the morning,
Fold my hands and pray for rain.
I got a head full of ideas
That are drivin' me insane.
It's a shame the way she makes me scrub the floor.
I ain't gonna work on Maggie's farm no more."
Maggie's Farm spoke to emancipation.22 The ADA, as I will
discuss later, speaks to emancipation; and Olmstead, when read (from
my perspective, at least) optimistically, speaks to emancipation. It is
this question of potential emancipation that I wish to address today. For
I believe that Olmstead is potentially the most important civil mental
disability law case since the Supreme Court decided Youngberg v.
Romeo" in 1982. Olmstead potentially has the capacity to transform
and revolutionize mental health law in the same profound ways that Bob
Dylan transformed and revolutionized popular culture. If Olmstead is
taken seriously, it may change the debate on institutional mental health
care, on community treatment, on deinstitutionalization, on the
segregation of persons with mental disabilities, on the future of the
"least restrictive alternative" doctrine, and perhaps most importantly, on
how we feel about persons with disabilities.
This paper will proceed in this manner. First, I will briefly discuss
the ADA so as to better contextualize the Olmstead case.24 Then, I will
consider the sparse pre-Olmstead litigation that dealt with questions
(Ga. Ct. App. 1993), reconsideration denied (1993), cert. denied (1994); Swofford v. Cooper,
360 S.E.2d 624 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987), rev'd, cert. granted, 368 S.E.2d 518 (Ga. 1988),
reconsideration denied (1988); release of insanity acquittees, see, e.g., Ledbetter v. Cannon,
384 S.E.2d 875 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989), reh'g denied (1989); and DuBose v. State, 251 S.E.2d 15
(Ga. Ct. App. 1978), reh 'g denied (1978); racial discrimination involving employees, see, e.g.,
Collier v. Dep't. of Human Resources, 397 S.E.2d 632 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990)) have been litigated,
is that there is no reason to expect that the conditions there are significantly different than the
conditions at many other American state hospitals--often dreary, dull, depressing, and
dispiriting. See generally Rebecca Perl, Suit Says Children Illegally Confined: Mental
Hospitals Misused?, ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 4, 1991, at AI (discussing a class action suit
brought against Georgia state hospitals, including Georgia Regional Hospital, alleging that
hundreds of non-mentally ill children were being unlawfully detained).
21. Bob Dylan, Lyrics 1962-1985 166 (1985).
22. See id.
23. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). See generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 9, § 3A-9, at 87-90 (2d ed.
1999).
24. See infra notes 31-79 and accompanying text.
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affecting persons institutionalized because of mental disability.2" Then,
I will address the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Olmstead,26 a case far
broader, and, to my mind, more visionary than the Supreme Court's
ultimate decision." Next, I will look at all the Olmstead opinions (for
there is much to learn from all of them).2" Following this, I will briefly
discuss the concepts of"sanism" and "pretextuality," two concepts that
I am convinced beyond a reasonable doubt explain much about the
incoherence of so much of mental disability law.29 Finally, I will
explain what I see as the overarching significance of Olmstead, and how
it may truly give institutionalized persons across the nation the capacity
to say, maybe even optimistically to sing, "I ain't gonna work on
Maggie's Farm no more."30
II. THE AMERICANS WiTH DISABILITIES ACT31
The Americans With Disabilities Act 32 has been hailed by advocates
for persons with disabilities as "a breathtaking promise,, 33 "the most
important civil rights act passed since 1964[,]"' and as the
"Emancipation Proclamation for those with disabilities." 35 It is, without
question, Congress's "most innovative attempt to address the pervasive
problems of discrimination against physically and mentally handicapped
citizens"36 by providing, in the words of a Congressional committee, "a
25. See infra notes 80-101 and accompanying text.
26. L.C. v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893 (1Ith Cir. 1998), aff'd and remanded, 119 S. Ct. 2176
(1999).
27. See infra notes 157-214 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 122-56 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 215-57 and accompanying text; see also PERLIN, supra note 1.
30. See infra notes 258-64 and accompanying text.
31. This section of the article and the accompanying footnotes were developed from
Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons With Mental Disabilities. Can Sanist Attitudes Be
Undone?, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 15, 15-27 (1993-94); and Michael L. Perlin, "Make Promises by
the Hour: " Sex, Drugs, the ADA, and Psychiatric Hospitalization, 46 DEPAUL L. REv. 947,
947-955 (1997) [hereinafter Promises].
32. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 (West 1995).
33. Bonnie Milstein et al., The Americans With Disabilities Act. A Breathtaking Promise
for People With Mental Disabilities, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1240 (1991).
34. Kent Jenkins Jr., Spotlight Finds Hoyer, WASHINGTON POST, May 28, 1990, at D.
35. Kimberly Ackourney, Comment, Insuring Americans With Disabilities: How Far Can
Congress Go to Protect Traditional Practices?, 40 EMORY L.J. 1183, 1183 (1991); see also
Sandra Law, The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990: Burden on Business or Dignity for
the Disabled?, 30 DUQ. L. REV. 99, 114 (1991) (stating that the ADA is a "solid and positive
step toward making this country a better nation").
36. PERLIN, supra note 9, § 6.44A, at 16 (1999 Cum. Supp.).
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clear and comprehensive national mandate to end discrimination against
persons with disabilities."37 The ADA provides basically the same
bundle of protections for persons with disabilities as the Civil Rights
Acts of the 1960s3" did for citizens of color with clear, strong, and
enforceable standards.39
The language that Congress chose to use in its introductory fact
finding is of extraordinary importance.4 ° Its specific finding that
individuals with disabilities are a "discrete and insular minority...
subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to
a position of political powerlessness' '4 is not just precatory flag-and-
apple-pie rhetoric.42 This language, granted "the force of law,"43 was
carefully chosen; and it comes from the heralded footnote four of the
United States v. Carolene Products case" that has served as the
springboard for nearly a half century of challenges to state and
municipal laws that have operated in discriminatory ways against other
minorities,45 and reflects a Congressional commitment to provide
37. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 23 (1990).
38. See generally 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1971, 1973 (West Supp. 1999).
39. Compare BONNIE P. TUCKER, The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990: An
Overview, 22 N.M.L.Rev. 13 (1992) (discussing enforcement provisions), with Pamela S.
Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation,
46 Duke L.J. 1 (1996) (reading the ADA to provide more protections than do other civil rights
acts).
40. See AMY LOWNDES, NOTE, The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990: A
Congressional Mandate for Heightened Judicial Protection of Disabled Persons, 44 FLA. L.
REV. 417, 446 (1992) (discussing the "shocking and eye-opening" nature of these findings).
41. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1210(a)(7) (West Supp. 1999).
42. See 2 PERLIN, supra note 9, § 7.13, at 617-23 (giving a full commentary on above
issues); see also Perlin, Promises, supra note 31, at 955 (discussing the question of whether key
sections of the ADA will be seen as little more than hortatory language). Compare Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp.v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 11 (1981) (stating that 42 U.S.C.A. § 6010
"simply does not create substantive rights" in developmentally disabled individuals with a
legally enforceable cause of action), with David Ferleger & Patrice Maguire Scott, Rights and
Dignity: Congress, the Supreme Court, and People With Disabilities After Pennhurst, 5 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 327, 350 (criticizing the conclusion as "absurd" and "objectionable" in an
article co-authored by plaintiffs' lead counsel in the Pennhurst case).
43. James B. Miller, The Disabled the ADA, and Strict Scrutiny, 6 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
393, 413 (1994).
44. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
45. See id; see also Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism," 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 380-81 n.51
(1992) (discussing the impact of this footnote on the development of mental disability law); and
I PERLIN, supra note 9, § 1-2.1, at 7 (2d ed. 1998). See, e.g., Susan Lee, Heller v. Doe:
Involuntary Civil Commitment and the "Objective" Language of Probability, 20 AM. J.L. &
MED. 457, 477 n.90 (1994) (reflecting Congressional intent to identify disabled persons as a
group "deserving heightened scrutiny"); Leonard S. Rubenstein, Ending Discrimination
2000] OLMSTEAD v. L. C.
protected class categorization for persons with disabilities." This in
turn forces courts to employ a "compelling state interest" or "strict
scrutiny" test in considering statutory and regulatory challenges to
allegedly discriminatory treatment.47 The law's invocation of the full
"sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment"' 8 simply means that any violation of the ADA
must be read in the same light as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution,49 guaranteeing, for the first time, that this
core constitutional protection will finally be made available to persons
Against Mental Health Treatment in Publicly Financed Health Care, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 315,
339 (1996) (demonstrating the ADA's invocation of the Carolene Products footnote justifies
employing "heightened judicial scrutiny" test); and Lisa Montanaro, Comment, The Americans
With Disabilities Act: Will the Court Get the Hint? Congress 'Attempt to Raise the Status of
Persons With Disabilities in Equal Protection Cases, 15 PACE L. REV. 621, 663 (1995) (stating
that by adopting the ADA, Congress attempted to utilize the Carolene Products theory to imply
that a "heightened level of scrutiny" should be used in ADA cases).
46. See Phyllis Coleman & Ronald A. Shellow, Ask About Conduct, Not Mental Illness:
A Proposal for Bar Examiners and Medical Boards to Comply With the ADA and the
Constitution, 20 J. LEGIS. 147, 151 n.23 (1994) (stating that "the ADA treats disabled persons
as a suspect class."); Lowndes, supra note 40, at 446 (stating that "Congress clearly intended
to create a new protected class--the disabled."); Miller, supra note 43, at 412 (stating that
Congress applied "suspect class" test in ADA statutory language); and Montanaro, supra note
45, at 664 (stating that "Congress' intent was to transform the disabled into a suspect class for
purposes of constitutional and statutory interpretation").
In a trilogy of employment cases, the Supreme Court recently narrowed the category
of persons who are to be treated as "disabled" under the ADA. See also Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133
(1999); Albertsons, Inc v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999) (sometimes called "the Sutton
trilogy"). Nothing in these decisions, however, goes to the question of how the Court would
construe discrimination cases involving individuals found to be "disabled" within the ADA's
meaning.
47. On the relationship between this language and the heightened scrutiny requirement,
see Crowder v. Kitagawa, 842 F. Supp. 1257, 1264 (D. Haw. 1994) (assuming application of
strict scrutiny level in ADA cases); William Christian, Note, Normalization as a Goal: The
Americans with Disabilities Act and Individuals with Mental Retardation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 409,
424 (1994) (stating that laws treating persons with disabilities differently should be subject to
heightened scrutiny).
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985), the
Supreme Court had ruled that mental retardation was neither a suspect class nor a quasi-suspect
class for purposes of equal protection analysis. In supporting its conclusion, it noted that a
contrary decision would have made it difficult to distinguish other groups such as persons with
mental illness "who have perhaps immutable disabilities setting them off from others, who
cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative responses, and who can claim some degree
of prejudice from at least part of the public at large." Id. at 445.
48. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(4) (West Supp. 1999).
49. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
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with disabilities.5"
Individuals in in-patient psychiatric hospitals comprise a population
that is classically voiceless and friendless, with few contacts in the "free
world." It is a population whose disenfranchisement starkly mirrors the
sort of powerlessness and marginalization spoken to by the Supreme
Court in the Carolene Products case and, of course, spoken to by
Congress in the ADA's initial findings section."
By its terms, the entire ADA applies to persons with mental
disabilities, including persons with mental illness. 2 Yet, very little of
the final statute, the legislative history, or floor debate focused on the
"grotesque" history of discrimination and mistreatment suffered by such
individuals;" the crushing economic, social, and psychological burdens
borne by such persons in their day-to-day lives; the conditions faced by
such persons when institutionalized in public facilities, or when
discharged from such facilities to lives of misery on our cities' streets
without adequate transitional mental health, medical, or social services;
or the pernicious legal effects that flow from the badge of mental
disability.
The legislative history is remarkably skimpy and speaks to only two
relevant considerations. First, it reflects Congressional awareness of the
danger of stereotyping behavior.55 It makes this clear through its heavy
reliance on the Supreme Court's language in School Board of Nassau
County v. Airline56 that "society's accumulated myths and fears about
50. See, e.g., Timothy M. Cook, The Americans With Disabilities Act: The Move to
Integration, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 393, 434 (1991) (finding "unambiguously that Congress
considered disability classifications to be just as serious and just as impermissible as racial
categorizations that are given 'strict' or 'heightened' scrutiny, sustainable by the courts only if
they are tailored to serve a 'compelling' governmental interest.").
Cook's article is cited approvingly in, inter alia, Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298,
308 (2d Cir. 1999); Kathleen S. v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 10 F. Supp. 2d 460 (E.D. Pa.
1998), stay denied, 10 F. Supp. 2d 476 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Valentine v. American Home Shield
Corp., 939 F. Supp, 1276, 1388 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Muller v. Hotsy Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1389,
1402 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Heather K. by Anita K. v. City of Mallard, Iowa, 887 F. Supp. 1249,
1263 (N.D. Iowa 1995); Hutchinson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 883 F. Supp. 379, 387 (N.D.
Iowa 1995); and Fink v. Kitzman, 881 F. Supp. 1347, 1368 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
51. See Rubenstein, supra note 45, at 338-39, 350.
52. See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 (West 1995).
53. See City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 454 (1985) (Stevens,
J., joined by Burger, C.J., concurring) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see generally Cook, supra note 50, at 399-407.
54. See Michael L. Perlin, "Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline: " Mental
Disability Law Theory and Practice, "Us" and "Them," 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 775, 779 (1998).
55. See Perlin, Promises, supra note 31, at 968.
56. 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (describing an individual with tuberculosis as a "handicapped
[Vol. 17:1
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disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations
that flow from the actual impairment."" Congress stressed that its
inclusion in the definition of a disability of an individual who is
regarded as being impaired"8 acknowledges this teaching about the
power of myths.59
Thus, employment decisions cannot be based on "paternalistic
views" of what is best for a person with a disability.' The employment
title of the ADA was thus designed, in significant part, to prevent
employers from relying "on presumptions, stereotypes, misconceptions,
and unfounded fears" in making employment decisions,6' and as a means
of breaking the chain of misperception that individuals with disabilities
are a "permanently helpless and separate class, unable to work or
otherwise contribute to society. 62
Second, the history of the "direct threat" section, again relying on the
Airline case, specifies that, for persons with mental disabilities, the
employer must identify "the specific behavior on the part of the
individual that would pose the anticipated direct threat," and that the
determination must be based on such behavior, "not merely on
generalizations about the disability."'63 In such a case, there must be
individual" under the amended § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
57. Id. at 284.
58. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(C) (West 1995).
59. See generally H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2 (1990).
60. See generally id.
61. Id. at 30. Discrimination against disabled persons "often results from false
presumptions, generalizations, misperceptions, patronizing attitudes, ignorance, irrational
fears[,] and pernicious mythologies." Id. at 57.
62. Elizabeth Morin, Note, Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990: Social Integration
Through Employment, 40 CATH. U. L. REv. 189, 189 (1990). On employers' myths in this
context, see Peter David Blanck, The Emerging Work Force: Empirical Study of the Americans
With Disabilities Act, 16 J. CORP. L. 693 (1991); and Peter David Blanck, Empirical Study of
the Employment Provisions of the Americans With Disabilities Act: Methods, Preliminary
Findings, and Implications, 22 N.M. L. REV. 119, 129 (1992). On the significance of
"misinformed stereotypes," see generally W. Robert Gray, The Essential-Function Limitation
of the Civil Rights of People With Disabilities and John Rawls 's Concept of Social Justice, 22
N. M. L. REV. 295, 317 (1992).
63. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 57 (stating that "[tihe determination that an
individual with a disability will pose a safety threat to others must be made on a case-by-case
basis and must not be based on... generalizations, misperceptions, ... ignorance, irrational
fears, [or] pernicious mythologies"); see also Ren~e Cyr, Note, The Americans With
Disabilities Act: Implications for Job Reassignment and the Treatment of Hypersusceptible
Employees, 57 BKLYN. L. REV. 1237, 1273 (1992) (stating that "[g]eneralized fear about risks
from the employment environment cannot be used by an employer to disqualify a person with
a disability").
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"objective evidence . . . that the person has a recent history of
committing overt acts or making threats which caused... or which
directly threatened harm."'
While these two excerpts are praiseworthy and important, that is all
there is. Nowhere else in any of the lengthy Congressional reports are
the specific biases (one of which is sanism) and prejudices faced by
persons with mental illness discussed. Although there is recognition that
much of the discrimination faced by disabled persons flows from
"unfounded, outmoded stereotypes and perceptions and deeply imbedded
prejudices," '5 the legislative history in no way illuminates the specific
prejudices and biases faced by mentally disabled persons, especially
those who were formerly institutionalized.'
Earlier, I alluded to the impact of "sanism" and "pretextuality" on
developments in this area. What do I mean by these terms?67 Simply
put, "sanism" is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character
of other irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing
social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry.68 It
infects both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices.69 "Sanism"'7
is largely invisible and largely socially acceptable. It is based
predominantly upon stereotype, myth, superstition, and
deindividualization; and it is sustained and perpetuated by our use of
alleged "ordinary common sense" and heuristic reasoning in an
unconscious response to events both in everyday life and in the legal
process.7
64. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 45-46.
65. Id. at 48.
66. On the way that these negative stereotypes affect our homelessness policies, see
generally Pedro Greer, Medical Problems of the Homeless: Consequences of Lack of Social
Policy - A Local Approach, 45 U. MIAMI L. REv. 407 (1990-91); Michael L. Perlin,
Competency, Deinstitutionalizatior, and Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization, 28 HOUS.
L. REv. 63 (1991).
67. See generally Michael L. Perlin, "Half- Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth: " Sanism,
Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental Disability Law Developed As It Did, 10 J. CONTEM,.
LEGAL ISSUES 3 (1999) (discussing sanism and pretextuality); PERIN, supra note 1.
68. See generally GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1955) (discussing
the classic treatment); ELISABET1 YOuNG-BRUEHL, THE ANATOMY OF PREJUDICE (1996)
(discussing an important new and different perspective); PERLIN, supra note 1, ch. 2 (discussing
roots of sanism and the relationship between sanism and other"ismic" behavior, such as racism
or sexism or homophobia); Perlin, supra note 45.
69. See Koe v. Califano, 573 F.2d 761, 764 (2d Cir. 1978). The phrase "sanism" was, to
the best of my knowledge, coined by Dr. Morton Brinbaum.
70. See Perlin, supra note 67, at 92-93 (discussing Dr. Morton Birnbaum's insights).
71. See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE
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"Pretextuality" means that courts accept (either implicitly or
explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest,
frequently meretricious, decision making, specifically where witnesses,
especially expert witnesses, show a "high propensity to purposely distort
their testimony in order to achieve desired ends."' This pretextuality is
poisonous: it infects all participants in the judicial system; breeds
cynicism and disrespect for the law; demeans participants; and reinforces
shoddy lawyering, blase judging, and, at times, perjurious and/or corrupt
testifying.
In a paper I published in 1997,"3 1 questioned whether:
If and when cases are brought seeking to apply the ADA to
individuals institutionalized in psychiatric hospitals, will federal courts
interpret the ADA as it was written (in the light of Congress's clear
statutory intent) or will the key language to which I have already alluded
be seen as little more than hortatory shibboleths? Will courts say, "No,
Congress really didn't mean what it said."? Would they say, "Well,
Congress may have meant it, but only in an aspirational way, and there's
really nothing for us here."?74 Or will they say, "Yes, Congress said it,
Congress meant it, and, dammit, we're gonna enforce it!"? 7"
Olmstead begins to answer these questions.
Persons with mental disabilities have faced the brunt of
discrimination for years. Surveys show that mental disabilities are the
most negatively perceived of all disabilities.76 Individuals with mental
disabilities have been denied jobs, refused access to apartments in public
housing or entry to places in public accommodation, and turned down for
(1994) (discussing sanism and its origins and causes).
72. Charles Sevilla, The Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjury, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
839, 840 (1974). See also Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law:
Of "Ordinary Common Sense," Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BuLL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131, 133 (1991).
73. See Perlin, Promises, supra note 31.
74. Compare Niece v. Fitzner, 941 F. Supp. 1497 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (refusing to follow
Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340 (4th Cir. 1995) (declining to apply the ADA to state prison
cases), with Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 S. Ct. 1952 (1998) (finding
unanimously that the ADA does apply to state prison cases). This is further discussed in
Michael L. Perlin, Hidden Agendas and Ripple Effects: Implications of Three Recent Supreme
court Decisions for Forensic Psychiatrists, 2. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY PRACTICE - (2000)
(in press).
75. Perlin, Promises, supra note 31 at 955.
76. See Jane West The Social Policy Context of the Act, in THE AMERICANS WITH
DxsAu.rrrs ACT: FROM POLICY TO PRACTICE 3, 9 (Jane West ed. 1991); see also infra text
accompanying notes 223-25 (discussing comments of Senator Helms in floor debate on the
ADA).
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participation in publicly-funded programs because they appear "strange"
or "different." 77 A series of behavioral myths has emerged suggesting
that persons with mental disabilities are deviant, worth less than
"normal" individuals, disproportionately dangerous, and presumptively
incompetent.78 Yet, putting aside the two exceptions that I have
discussed, nothing in the ADA speaks directly to these myths or to the
special problems faced by persons with mental disabilities in attempting
to combat them.79
A. Early Case LaW0
The ADA title most important to institutionalized psychiatric patients
is Title II.81 Under Title II, "no qualified individual with a disability
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or
be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. "8 The
legislative history stresses that discrimination continued in "such critical
areas as institutionalization."3 Although this title has not been the
subject of much consideration in institutional cases, courts have held that
allegations of restraint, isolation, and segregation could constitute
77. See Tucker, supra note 39, at 16-17 (describing particularly cruel examples); see also
Cook, supra note 50, at 399-41, 424.
78. See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 45, at 393-97 (citing, inter alia, SANDER GILMAN,
DIFFERENCE AND PATHOLOGY: STEREOTYPES OF SEXUALITY, RACE AND MADNESS (1985));
Thomas Grisso & Paul Appelbaum, Mentally Ill and Non-Mentally Ill Patients'Abilities to
Understand Informed Consent Disclosures for Medication, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 377, 385-
86 (1991); Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity
Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 693-96 (1989-90); Steven Schwartz,
Damage Actions as a Strategy for Enhancing the Quality of Care of Persons With Mental
Disabilities, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 651, 681 (1.989-90); Linda Teplin, The
Criminality of the Mentally Ill. A Dangerous Misconception, 142 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 593, 597-
98(1985).
79. See generally Wayne Ramage, The Pariah Patient: The Lack of Funding for Mental
Health Care, 45 VAND. L. REV. 951 (1992) (discussing the way that public perceptions of
mental illness and the accompanying stigma perpetuate inadequate treatment of the mentally ill).
80. This section of the article and the accompanying footnotes were developed from
Michael L. Perlin, "Make Promises by the Hour." Sex, Drugs, the ADA, and Psychiatric
Hospitalization, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 947, 960-62 (1997).
81. See 42 U.S.C.A. § § 12131-165 (West 1995); see also Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle,
184 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, in part, Alsbrook v. Arkansas, 120 S. Ct. 1003
(2000), cert. dismissed, 120 S. Ct. 1265 (2000).
82. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132 (West 1995).
83. L.C. v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 901 (11 th Cir. 1998). See generally H.R. REP. No.
101-485, pt. 2 (1989).
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discriminatory treatment under the ADA,84 and that the Act requires that
a psychiatric patient "be placed in the most integrated setting... which
meets the needs of [his] disability but which gives [him] the most
freedom."85
Most of the ADA/mental disability case law has focused on questions
of professional licensing and examinations and on the range of
accommodations necessary in employment situations.86 Several courts
have enjoined bar committees from inquiries into applicants' history of
having 'been treated for mental disorders, but others have declined to do
so." Yet, other courts have considered the application of the ADA to
conditions under which professional licensing exams are to be taken. 8
On whether accommodations are reasonable in the employment context,
courts are split, and it appears that most decisions have been fact-based,
turning on the individual judge's perception as to whether the plaintiff
could perform the job tasks satisfactorily, even with the statutorily-
mandated "reasonable accommodation."89
There is a smattering of other mental disability cases that focus on
issues somewhat closer to the ones that are at the heart of this section.
84. See Roe v. Community Comm'n, 926 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. W. Va. 1996).
85. Charles Q. v. Houstoun, Civ. A., No. 1, CV-95-280 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 1996),
reported in Rights in Facilities, 20 MENT. & PHYs. Dis. L. REP. 490, 490 (1996) see also
Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 784 F. Supp. 215, 224 (E.D. Pa. 1992), affid, 977
F.2d 568 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that "in enacting the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990,
Congress affirmed that § 504 prohibits unnecessary segregation").
86. See PERLIN, supra note 9, § 6.44AA at, 70 n.473.43dl (Cur. Supp. 1999).
87. See Clark v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Exam'rs., 880 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va. 1995), and
Ellen S. v. Florida Bd. of Bar Exam'rs., 859 F. Supp. 1489 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (enjoining
inquiries); McCready v. Illinois Bd. of Admissions, 1995 WL 29609 (N.D. Il1. 1995), and
Campbell v. Greisberger, 865 F. Supp. 115 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (allowing inquiries). See also
supra note 46 (discussing the Sutton trilogy, and noting that immediately after the Court handed
down its decision, the Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit's decision in another bar case,
Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Bar Exam'rs., 156 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 1998), vacated, 119 S.
Ct. 2388 (1999)).
88. See, e.g., Argen v. New York State Bd. of Bar Exam'rs., 860 F. Supp. 84 (W.D.N.Y.
1994); In re Rubenstein, 637 A.2d 1131 (Del. 1994); and In re Underwood, 1993 WL 649283
(Me. 1993).
89. See Susie v. Apple Tree Preschool & Child Care Ctr., Inc., 866 F. Supp. 390 (N.D.
Iowa 1994); Kemo v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 1994 WL 511289 (N.D. Il. 1994); Voytek v.
University of Cal., 1994 WL 478805 (N.D. Cal. 1994). See generally Susan Stefan, "You'd
Have to Be Crazy to Work Here:" Worker Stress, the Abusive Workplace, and Title I of the
ADA, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 795, 805 (1998) (arguing that "judicial assumptions about the nature
of psychiatric disabilities and essential employment functions have resulted in the near-total
failure of the ADA to protect individuals with psychiatric disabilities from employment
discrimination"); SusAN STEFAN, PSYCHIATRIC DisABELrry AND DISCRmNATION LAW (2000)
(in press).
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For instance, a federal district court in Florida found an ADA violation
when a town's budget cuts eliminated community recreational programs
that were solely for persons with disabilities,"° as did a federal district
court in Massachusetts considering a state law that required state hospital
residents to contribute to the costs of assigned counsel.9' On the other
hand, a District of Columbia district court ruled that mentally disabled
residents of a homeless shelter failed to state a claim in their allegations
that restrictions on their freedom of expression were in violation of the
same Act.9
2
The most important of these cases is Helen L. v. DiDario,93 finding
that a state welfare department regulation that forced certain patients to
receive required care services in the segregated setting of a nursing
home, rather than in their own homes, violated the ADA.94 Helen L. is
significant for several reasons. First, the Third Circuit read the Act's
antidiscrimination language broadly and loudly.95 It cited Congressional
findings that "[h]istorically, society has tended to isolate and segregate
individuals with disabilities . . . such forms of discrimination . . .
continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem."96 Furthermore,
"the Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to
assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and
economic self-sufficiency for such individuals."9' 7 Next, it read the ADA
as being intended to insure that "qualified individuals receive services in
a manner consistent with basic human dignity rather than a manner
which shunts them aside, hides, and ignores them[,]" and declared that
it would "not eviscerate the ADA by conditioning its protections upon
a finding of intentional or overt 'discrimination[,]"' ' ' focusing
specifically on Congress's finding that "discrimination against
individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as . . .
institutionalization."" Finally, it rejected the state's argument that it
could not change the plaintiffs regimen of care because the two
90. See Concerned Parents to Save Dreher Park Ctr. v. City of West Palm Beach, 846 F.
Supp. 986 (S.D. Fla. 1994), supplemented, 853 F. Supp. 424 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
91. See T.P. v. DuBois, 843 F. Supp. 775 (D. Mass. 1993).
92. See Melton v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 1993 WL 367113 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
93. 46 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 813 (1995).
94. See id. at 327.
95. Seeid. at335.
96. Id. at 332 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(2) (West 1995)).
97. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(8) (West 1995)).
98. Id. at 335.
99. Id. at 336 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(3) (West 1995)).
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programs in question were funded on separate budgetary lines."° In
language that has potential impact on all cases assessing the potentially
discriminatory basis of the provision of public hospital service benefits,
the court was clear:
[T]he ADA applies to the General Assembly of Pennsylvania, and not
just to DPW [Department of Public Welfare]. DPW can not rely upon a
funding mechanism of the General Assembly to justify administering its
attendant care program in a manner that discriminates and then argue that
it can not comply with the ADA without fundamentally altering its
program.
Because the Commonwealth, including all its branches, is bound by
the decree, the argument of inability to comply rings hollow. Even if the
executive branch defendants were physically or legally incapable of
complying with the decree, those Commonwealth officials sitting in the
General Assembly certainly are not incapable of insuring the
Commonwealth's compliance [citation omitted]. The same applies here:
since the Commonwealth has chosen to provide services to [plaintiff]
under the ADA, it must do so in a manner which comports with the
requirements of that statute.'0'
B. The Literature°2
By far, the most important analytic piece discussing the ADA and its
potential impact here has been Timothy Cook's "The Americans with
Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration" article in Temple Law
Review."°3 Cook explicitly argued that the ADA meant an end to what
he termed the segregation of institutions for persons with mental
disabilities."' He read Congressional intent through the legislative
history to abolish, in Senator Weicker's words, "monoliths of isolated
care in institutions and in segregated educational settings .... Separate
is not equal. It was not for blacks; it is not for the disabled."' 5 The
House Judiciary Report here was equally explicit: "[i]ntegration is
fundamental to the purposes of the ADA. Provision[s] of segregated
accommodations and services relegate persons with disabilities to
100. See id.at 338.
101. Id. at 338-39 (citations omitted).
102. This section of the article and the accompanying footnotes were developed from
Michael L. Perlin, "Make Promises by the Hour:" Sex, Drugs, the ADA, and Psychiatric
Hospitalization, 46 DEPAuL L. REv. 947, 962-64 (1997).
103. See Cook, supra note 50.
104. See id. at 429.
105. Id. at 423.
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second-class citizen status."'" Cook read the act to bar intentional and
unintentional discrimination, °7 and quoted researchers who concluded
that "institutions and other segregated settings are simply
unacceptable."'0 °  He concluded that the Act's invocation of the
Fourteenth Amendment effectively overruled the "substantial
professional judgment" standard of Youngberg v. Romeo. '
Can these same arguments be made about cases involving persons
institutionalized because of mental illness? Are there clear differences?
Do police power considerations inherent in the involuntary civil
commitment process make a difference? Does the invocation of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the use of "discrete and insular minority"
language truly alter the Youngberg standard?"l
I wrote more than five years ago that "[t]hese are difficult questions
for which there are no ready or apparent easy answers,' '  and little has
changed my mind since then. Cook's article has been cited in a number
of federal court decisions in cases, mostly decided by the same judge," 2
involving a range of ADA topics, from a case brought by a child with a
severe respiratory condition who sought to ban exceptions to a city's ban
on open burning' to employment discrimination cases brought by
persons suffering from asthma," 4 shoulder injury,' carpal tunnel
106. Id. at 424.
107. See id. at 427.
108. Id. at 413.
109. Id. at 466 (discussing Youngberg v. Romeo 457 U.S. 307 (1982)); see Olmstead v.
L.C., 119 S. Ct. 2176, 2181 (1999) (noting that the Court specifically underscored that there
was no constitutional issue presented to the Court in this case). On the professional judgment
standard, see generally Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the Experts: From Deference to
Abdication Under the Professional Judgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639 (1992); 2 PERLIN,
supra note 9, § 3A-9.4 at 95-98 (2d ed. 1999).
110. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2152 (1999) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (stating that "Congress's use of the [discrete and insular minority] phrase... is a
telling indication of its intent to restrict the ADA's coverage to a confined, and historically
disadvantaged, class").
111. Perlin, ADA, supra note 3 1, at 38.
112. In addition to the cases cited infra notes 113-118, see also Helen L. v. DiDario, 46
F.3d 325, 331 (3d Cir. 1995); Easley by Easley v. Snider, 841 F. Supp. 668, 677 (E.D. Pa.
1993), rev'd, 36 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 1994).
113. See Heather K. v. City of Mallard, Iowa, 887 F. Supp. 1249, 1251 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
114. See Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 302 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1999); Valentine v. American
Home Shield Corp., 939 F. Supp. 1376, 1379 (N.D. Iowa 1996).




syndrome,16 spinal injury, " 7 and a challenge to fees for disability
parking placards. "8 Besides Helen L., one case involving the sort of "big
issue" that Cook's methodology might eventually reach, Kathleen S. v.
Dept. of Public Welfare," 9 held that a state's decision to close a state
hospital violated the ADA by depriving residents of their right to receive
services in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs. 20
Nonetheless, Cook's article provides litigators with a blueprint for
frontal attacks on Youngberg-based caselaw 2' that limits patients' civil
and treatment rights. The unanswered question here, of course, is
whether institutional plaintiffs' litigators will take the challenge.
C. Olmstead v. L. C.'22
In retrospect, all of these developments, with the exception of Helen
L. and possibly Kathleen S., may appear to be little more than the prelude
to Olmstead. In Olmstead, the Court qualifiedly affirmed a decision by
the Eleventh Circuit that had provided the first coherent answer to the
question of the right of institutionalized persons with mental disabilities
to community services under the ADA.' There, the court of appeals
had found that the ADA entitled plaintiffs, residents of Georgia State
Hospital, to treatment in an "integrated setting" as opposed to an
"unnecessarily segregated" state hospital.'24
Plaintiffs L.C. and E.W. challenged their placement at Georgia State
Hospital, arguing that Title II of the ADA entitled them to "the most
integrated setting appropriate to [their] needs."' 25 The district court
granted summary judgment to plaintiffs, finding that the state's failure
to place them in an "appropriate community-based treatment program"
116. See Fink v. Kitzman, 881 F. Supp. 1347, 1356 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
117. See Muller v. Hotsy Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1389, 1399 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
118. See Dare v. California, 191 F.3d 1167, 1169 (9th Cir. 1999).
119. 10 F. Supp. 2d 460 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
120. See id. at 471, stay denied, 10 F. Supp.2d 476 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
121. See 2 PERLIN, supra note 9, § 3A-12.1, at 120-21 n.965 (2d ed. 1999) (citing cases).
Another major potential persuasive scholarly force is Rubenstein, supra note 45, at 319 (urging
litigators to focus on the ADA as a source of rights in combating discrimination in health
benefits for persons with psychiatric disabilities).
122. 119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999).
123. See L.C. v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893 (1 1th Cir. 1998), affd and remanded, 119 S. Ct.
2176 (1999).
124. L.C., 138 F.3d at 897.
125. Id. at 895. Although both plaintiffs were transferred to community settings prior to
the court's decision, the court declined to find the case moot as such cases were "capable of
repetition, yet evading review." Id. at n.2.
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violated the ADA,12 6 and the state appealed. 27 On appeal, the Eleventh
Circuitaffirmed the judgment that the state had discriminated against the
plaintiffs, but also remanded "for further findings related to the State's
defense that the relief sought by plaintiffs would 'fundamentally alter the
nature of the service, program, or activity."" 2
The court began its opinion by reviewing the pertinent statutory
sections 29 and the relevant regulations promulgated by the Attorney
General pursuant to statutory authority. 3' Under these regulations, "[a]
public entity shall administer services, programs, and activities in the
most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals
with disabilities,"'' and placement is required "in a setting that enables
individuals with disabilities to interact with non-disabled persons to the
fullest extent possible."'32 The court found that "[p]lacement in the
community provides an integrated treatment setting, allowing disabled
individuals to interact with non-disabled persons-an opportunity
permitted only in limited circumstances within the walls of segregated
state institutions such as [the state hospital]."'3 It thus concluded that
the "express terms" of the regulation, "supported by the Attorney
General's consistent interpretation, plainly prohibit a state from treating
individuals with disabilities in a segregated environment where a more
integrated setting would be appropriate...."""
It then looked at the Congressional findings and legislative history
that "make clear" Congress's aim "to eliminate the segregation of
individuals with disabilities:"' 35
In enacting the ADA, Congress determined that discrimination against
individuals with disabilities persists in a wide variety of areas of social
life, including "institutionalization," 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3)(1995), and
that "individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of
discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion . . . [and]
segregation... .",42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101
(a)(2) ("[H]istorically, society has tended to isolate and segregate
individuals with disabilities, and... such forms of discrimination against
126. Id. at 895.
127. See id.
128. Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1999)).
129. See id. at 896 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12132, 12134 (West 1995)).
130. See id. at 896-98.
131. Id. at 897 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1999)).
132. Id. (summarizing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1999)).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 898.
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individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social
problem.").
Indeed, the legislative history makes clear that Congress considered
the provision of segregated services to individuals with disabilities a form
of discrimination prohibited by the ADA. See S.Rep. No. 101-116 at 20
(1989) (noting "compelling need to provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate.., for the integration of persons with disabilities into
the economic and social mainstream of American life"); H.R.Rep. No.
10 1-485, pt. 2 at 29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 310
(listing "segregation" as a form of "[d]iscrimination against people with
disabilities")[.' 36
On this point the court concluded, "[c]ertainly, the denial of
community placements to individuals with disabilities such as L.C. and
E.W. is precisely the kind of segregation that Congress sought to
eliminate. "137
The court continued with its focus on the "basic goal" of the ADA:
The ADA does not only mandate that individuals with disabilities be
treated the same as persons without such disabilities. Underlying the
ADA's prohibitions is the notion that individuals with disabilities must
be accorded reasonable accommodations not offered to other persons in
order to ensure that individuals with disabilities enjoy "equality of
opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-
sufficiency .... 3
It described the "reasonable accommodation duty" as requiring the
state to "place individuals with disabilities in the most integrated setting
appropriate to their needs[,]"' 39 and relied on language from both the Third
Circuit's decision in Helen L. v. DiDario4° and Justice Marshall's
separate opinion in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center 4 stating
that "[t]he ADA is intended to ensure that qualified individuals receive
services in a manner consistent with basic human dignity rather than a
manner that shunts them aside, hides, and ignores them.' ' 2
The court found that malevolent intent is not required. The state's
"indifference to L.C. and E.W.'s needs, manifested by their refusal to
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 899 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(8) (West 1995), and citing Willis v.
Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding that the goal of the ADA is to
ensure people with disabilities can participate in society)).
139. Id. at 899.
140. 46 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995); see also supra text accompanying notes 93-101.
141. 473 U.S. 432, 455-78 (1985).
142. L.C., 138 F.3d at 899-900 (quoting Helen L., 46 F.3d at 335, and City of Cleburne,
473 U.S. 432, 461-64).
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place them in the community while recognizing the propriety of such a
placement, is exactly the kind of conduct that the ADA was designed to
prevent."'43 Here it drew on Supreme Court language from a § 504 case,
Alexander v. Choate:'
Discrimination against the handicapped was perceived by Congress to
be most often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of
thoughtlessness and indifference-of benign neglect. Thus, Representative
Vanik ... described the treatment of the handicapped as one [of] the
country's "most shameful oversights," which caused the handicapped to
live among society "shunted aside, hidden, and ignored."
* * * Federal agencies and commentators on the plight of the
handicapped similarly have found that discrimination against the
handicapped is primarily the result of apathetic attitudes rather than
affirmative animus. 45
Importantly, the court rejected the state's argument that plaintiffs'
claims must fail because the denial of community-based placements was
based on lack of funds."4 "[T]he plain language of the ADA's Title II
regulations, as well as the ADA's legislative history, make clear that
Congress wanted to permit a cost defense only in the most limited of
circumstances . . ." only where those accommodations "would
fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity."'47 The
court cited a House Judiciary report explaining:
The fact that it is more convenient, either administratively or fiscally,
to provide services in a segregated manner, does not constitute a valid
justification for separate or different services under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, or under this title .... The existence of such programs
can never be used as a basis to... refuse to provide an accommodation in
a regular setting.'4
The court stressed that its holding did not "mandate the
deinstitutionalization of individuals with disabilities.' 49  Instead, it
clarified:
[W]e hold that where, as here, a disabled individual's treating
143. Id. at 901.
144. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
145. L.C., 138 F.3d at 901 (quoting Alexander, 469 U.S. at 295-96).
146. See id. at 902.
147. Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1999)).
148. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 50). The L.C. court distinguished cases
such as S.H. v. Edwards, 886 F.2d 292 (11 th Cir. 1989), as those cases did not have occasion
to consider the "integration regulation" that was central to the methodology in deciding ADA
cases. See id. at 901-02.
149. Id. at902.
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professionals find that a community-based placement is appropriate for
that individual, the ADA imposes a duty to provide treatment in a
community setting-the most integrated setting appropriate to that patient's
needs. Where there is no such finding, on the other hand, nothing in the
ADA requires the deinstitutionalization of that patient' 5
The court pointed out that experts, including one of E.W.'s treating
physicians, were unanimous that E.W. could be treated in a community
setting, provided she were given "the level of care and supervision she
needed.'' Again, it underscored:
We do not suggest that should a trial court find that a patient, for
medical reasons, needs institutionalized care, it must nonetheless order
placement in a community-based treatment program. We recognize that
the determination whether a patient can be appropriately placed in a
community-based treatment program is a fluid one, subject to change as
the patient's medical condition improves or worsens. Over the course of
litigation, there may be times that a patient can be treated in the
community, and others where an institutional placement is necessary. But
where, as here, the evidence is clear that all the experts agree that, at a
given time, the patient could be treated in a more integrated setting, the
ADA mandates that it do so at that time unless placing that individual
would constitute a fundamental alteration in the state's provision of
services. Nothing in the ADA, however, forbids a state from moving a
patient back to an institutionalized treatment setting, as the patient's
condition necessitates. 5 2
The court then turned to the state's lack of funds argument. The duty
to provide services is not absolute, it noted, and the state need not
provide the services in question "if to do so would require a fundamental
alteration in its programs."' 53  However, the plaintiffs adequately
demonstrated to the court that the state could "reasonably modify its
provision of services by providing treatment to them in an integrated
[community] setting."'M It continued by noting that "the ADA does not
150. Id.
151. Id. at 902-03.
152. Id. at 903. The court further stressed "because the State's own professionals agreed
that E.W. could be placed in a less segregated setting, the State has failed to demonstrate that
there is a material issue of fact for trial .... " Id.
153. Id. at 904. "Under Title II, '[a] public entity shall make reasonable modifications in
policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination
on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications
would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity."' Id. (quoting 28
C.F.R. § 35.130 (b)(7) (1999)).
154. Id.
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permit the State to justify its discriminatory treatment of individuals with
disabilities on the grounds that providing non-discriminatory treatment
will require additional expenditures of state funds."'"
However, because the trial court did not consider the question of
whether the additional expenditures necessitated by community
treatment would "fundamentally alter the services [the state] provides,"
the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case for the trial court to consider:
(1) whether the additional expenditures necessary to treat L.C. and
E.W. in community-based care would be unreasonable given the
demands of the State's mental health budget; (2) whether it would
be unreasonable to require the State to use additional available
Medicaid waiver slots, as well as its authority under Georgia law to
transfer funds from institutionalized care to community-based care, to
minimize any financial burden on the State; and (3) whether any
difference in the cost of providing institutional or community-based
care will lessen the State's financial burden. I"
On appeal, the Supreme Court, in a split opinion per Justice
Ginsburg,' 57 qualifiedly affirmed.' After setting out the provisions of
the ADA that focused on the institutional segregation and isolation of
persons with disabilities, and the discrimination faced by persons with
disabilities (including "exclusion ... [and] segregation"), 59 the Court
reviewed the key Department of Justice regulations, including the
"integration [mandate] regulation,"'' pointing out that the case, as
presented, did not challenge their legitimacy.' 6' It then set out its
holding:
155. Id. at 904-05 (citing United States v. Bd. of Trustees for Univ. of Alabama, 908 F.2d
740 (11 th Cir. 1990)).
156. Id. at 905. In an accompanying footnote, the court added: "We note that this case is
not a class action, but a challenge brought on behalf of two individual plaintiffs. Our holding
is not meant to resolve the more difficult questions of fundamental alteration that might be
present in a class action suit seeking deinstitutionalization of a state hospital." Id. at n. 10.
157. See Olmstead v. L.C., 119 S. Ct. 2176,2176,2179 (1999). Justices O'Connor, Breyer,
Souter, and Stevens (the latter in a separate opinion) joined Justice Ginsburg in most of her
opinion. Justice Stevens, who would have preferred to simply affirm the Eleventh Circuit's
opinion, joined with these four justices in all of the opinion save that portion that outlined the
State's obligations in such cases, see infra text accompanying note 180. Justice Kennedy filed
a concurring opinion, joined in part by Justice Breyer, see infra text accompanying notes 181-
193. Justice Thomas dissented for himself, the Chief Justice, and Justice Scalia, see infra text
accompanying notes 194-198.
158. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2176 (1999).
159. Id. at 2181 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(5)).
160. Id. at 2183 (referring to 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A (1998)).
161. See id.
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We affirm the Court of Appeals' decision in substantial part.
Unjustified isolation, we hold, is properly regarded as discrimination
based on disability. But we recognize, as well, the States' need to
maintain a range of facilities for the care and treatment of persons with
diverse mental disabilities, and the States' obligation to administer
services with an even hand. Accordingly, we further hold that the Court
of Appeals' remand instruction was unduly restrictive. In evaluating a
State's fundamental-alteration defense, the District Court must consider,
in view of the resources available to the State, not only the cost of
providing community-based care to the litigants, but also the range of
services the State provides others with mental disabilities, and the State's
obligation to mete out those services equitably."
The Court endorsed the Department of Justice's position that "undue
institutionalization qualifies as discrimination, 'by reason of.
disability,"'" 63 and then characterized the ADA as having "stepped up
earlier measures to secure opportunities for people with developmental
disabilities to enjoy the benefits of community living[,] ' "' stressing how
much more comprehensive the ADA was than had been "aspirational"
or "hortatory" laws, such as the Developmentally Disabled Assistance
and Bill of Rights Act.'65 It then focused on what it saw as
Congressional judgment supporting the finding that "unjustified
institutional isolation of persons with disabilities is a form ofdiscrimination[:]""'
First, institutional placement of persons who can handle and benefit
from community settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that
persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in
community life. Cf. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755, 104 S.Ct. 3315,
82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984) ("There can be no doubt that [stigmatizing injury
often caused by racial discrimination] is one of the most serious
consequences of discriminatory government action."); Los Angeles Dept.
of Water andPower v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707, n. 13, 98 S.Ct. 1370,
55 L.Ed.2d 657 (1978) ("In forbidding employers to discriminate against
individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex
stereotypes.") (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d
162. Id. at2185.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2186.
165. See id. (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (2), as construed in Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24 (1984)). See generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 9, § 7.13, at 617-23
(2d ed. 1999).
166. Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2187.
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1194,1198 (C.A.7 1971)). Second, confinement in an institution severely
diminishes the everyday life activities of individuals, including family
relations, social contacts, work options, economic independence,
educational advancement, and cultural enrichment. See Brief for
American Psychiatric Association et al. as Amici Curiae 20-22. Dissimilar
treatment correspondingly exists in this key respect: In order to receive
needed medical services, persons with mental disabilities must, because
of those disabilities, relinquish participation in community life they could
enjoy given reasonable accommodations, while persons without mental
disabilities can receive the medical services they need without similar
sacrifice. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 6-7, 17.167
The majority immediately clarified some qualifications in its opinion.
It emphasized that the ADA did not "condone[ ] termination of
institutional settings for persons unable to handle or benefit from
community settings, '' 6s that the states "generally may rely on the
reasonable assessments of its own professionals in determining whether
an individual" is eligible for community-based programs, 69 and that
there was no "requirement that community-based treatment be imposed
on patients who do not desire it."' 7° None of these issues, however, were
present in the case before it: "[Georgia's] professionals determined that
community-based treatment would be appropriate for [the plaintiffs],"
both of whom desired such treatment.' 7' The Court added one additional
word of caution here:
We do not in this opinion hold that the ADA imposes on the States a
"standard of care" for whatever medical services they render, or that the
ADA requires States to "provide a certain level of benefits to individuals
with disabilities."... We do hold, however, that States must adhere to the
ADA's nondiscrimination requirement with regard to the services they in
fact provide.'72
The Court then turned to the questions of remedy and enforcement.
7 1
It rejected the Eleventh Circuit's construction of the "reasonable-
modification regulations" as "unacceptable" in that "it would leave the
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 2188.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at n.14.
173. Although this section of the opinion was co-signed by only four justices (Ginsburg,
Souter, Breyer and O'Connor), a reading of it in tandem with Justice Kennedy's concurrence,
see infra text accompanying notes 181-193, makes it likely that it will be treated by lower courts
as having the weight of a majority opinion.
[Vol. 17:1
OLMSTEAD v. L. C.
State virtually defenseless" if the plaintiff demonstrates she is qualified
for the program or placement she seeks. 74 Rather, the Court concluded:
Sensibly construed, the fundamental-alteration component of the
reasonable-modifications regulation would allow the State to show that,
in the allocation of available resources, immediate relief for the plaintiffs
would be inequitable, given the responsibility the State has undertaken for
the care and treatment of a large and diverse population of persons with
mental disabilities."' 75
The ADA, it concluded, "is not reasonably read to . . . phase out
institutions, placing patients in close care at risk," nor is the law's
mission "to drive States to move institutionalized patients into an
inappropriate setting, such as a homeless shelter[.]"'76  "For other
[patients], no placement outside the institution may ever be
appropriate."' 77 Because of these factors, Justice Ginsburg concluded
that the state must have more leeway than offered by the Eleventh
Circuit's remedy:
If, for example, the State were to demonstrate that it had a
comprehensive, effectively working plan for placing qualified persons
with mental disabilities in less restrictive settings, and a waiting list that
moved at a reasonable pace not controlled by the State's to keep its
institutions fully populated, the reasonable-modifications standard would
be met. 78
She summarized in this way:
[U]nder Title II of the ADA, States are required to provide
community-based treatment for persons with mental disabilities when the
State's treatment professionals determine that such placement is
appropriate, the affected persons do not oppose such treatment, and the
placement can be reasonably accommodated, taking into account there
sources available to the State and the needs of others with mental
disabilities. 79
174. Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2188.
175. Id. at 2189.
176. Id. At one point, Georgia had proposed such a placement for one of the named
plaintiffs, and then later retracted it. See id.
177. Id. On this point, the opinion cited, inter alia, Justice Blackmun's concurrence in
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982): "For many mentally retarded people, the difference
between the capacity to do things for themselves within an institution and total dependence on
the institution for all of their needs is as much liberty as they ever will know." Id. at 327.
178. Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2189.
179. Id. at 2190.
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Justice Stevens concurred, stating that he would have preferred
simply affirming the Eleventh Circuit's opinion, but because there were
not five votes for that disposition, he joined in all of Justice Ginsburg's
opinion, except for the remedy-enforcement portion."S Justice Kennedy
concurred, urging "caution and circumspection" in the enforcement of
the Olmstead case. '' After stressing that "persons with mental
disabilities have been subject to historic mistreatment, indifference, and
hostility[,]' ' 82  he traced what he saw as the history of
deinstitutionalization: that, while it "has permitted a substantial number
of mentally disabled persons to receive needed treatment with greater
freedom and dignity[,]" it has "ha[d] its dark side" as well. 3 Here he
quoted extensively from the writings of E. Fuller Torrey:
For a substantial minority . . .deinstitutionalization has been a
psychiatric Titanic. Their lives are virtually devoid of "dignity"or
"'integrity of body, mind, and spirit." "Self-determination" often means
merely that the person has a choice of soup kitchens. The "least restrictive
setting" frequently turns out to be a cardboard box, a jail cell, or a terror-
filled existence plagued by both real and imaginary enemies.'"
"It would be a tragic event," Justice Kennedy warned, if states read the
ADA, as construed in Olmstead, in such a way as to create an incentive
to states, "for fear of litigation, to drive those in need of medical care and
treatment out of appropriate care and into settings with too little
assistance and supervision[,]J ' 85 and he thus emphasized that "opinion[s]
of a responsible treating physician [should] be given the greatest of
deference."' 86  He underscored what he saw as a "common
phenomenon:"
It is a common phenomenon that a patient functions well with
medication, yet, because of the mental illness itself, lacks the discipline or
capacity to follow the regime the medication requires. This is illustrative
of the factors a responsible physician will consider in recommending the
appropriate setting or facility for treatment.'
Because of these concerns, and his fear that "[s]tates may be
180. See id.
181. Id. at 2192.
182. Id. at 2191.
183. Id.
184. Id. (quoting E. FULLER ToRREY, OUT OF THE SHADowS I I (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
1997)).
185. Id. at 2191-92.




pressured into attempting compliance on the cheap, placing marginal
patients into integrated settings devoid of the services and attention
necessary for their condition," Justice Kennedy again urged "caution and
circumspection" and "great deference to the medical decisions of...
responsible, treating physicians. '
He continued'89 by articulating what he saw as the necessary
elements of a discrimination finding, 9 ' and then raised federalism
concerns: "[g]rave constitutional concerns are raised when a federal
court is given the authority to review the State's choices in basic matters
such as establishing or declining to establish new programs. It is not
reasonable to read the ADA to permit court intervention in these
decisions."191
Finally, he parted company from Justice Ginsburg on the weight she
gave to the Congressional findings. The findings in question, he
concluded, "do not show that segregation and institutionalization are
always discriminatory or that, by their nature, are forms of prohibited
discrimination."'9 "Instead, they underscore Congress's concern that
discrimination has been a frequent and pervasive problem in institutional
settings and policies and its concern that segregating disabled persons
from others can be discriminatory.' 93
Justice Thomas dissented, criticizing the majority opinion for its
interpreting 'discrimination' that encompassed disparate treatment
among members of the same protected class[,]"J 94 arguing that the
Congressional findings on which the majority premised its conclusions
were "vague" and written in "general hortatory terms,"' 95 that its
"approach impose[d] significant federalism costs, '  and warning that
states "will now be forced to defend themselves in federal court every
188. Id. at 2192.
189. Justice Breyer joined in the prior portion of Justice Kennedy's concurrence, but not
in the portion discussed infra text accompanying notes 190-93.
190. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2192. The Court stated:
If they could show that persons needing psychiatric or other medical services to treat a
mental disability are subject to a more onerous condition than are persons eligible for
other existing state medical services, and if removal of the condition would not be a
fundamental alteration of a program or require the creation of a new one, then the
beginnings of a discrimination case would be established.
Id.
191. Id. at 2193.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 2194.
195. Id. at 2197.
196. Id. at 2198.
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time resources prevent the immediate placement of a qualified
individual."'" He concluded, "[c]ontinued institutional treatment of
persons who, though now deemed treatable in a community placement,
must wait their turn for placement, does not establish that the denial of
community placement occurred 'by reason of' their disability. Rather,
it establishes no more than the fact that petitioners have limited
resources."'
19
Olmstead is significant for several reasons. First, it is the first time
that the Supreme Court has ruled on the applicability of the ADA to
community-based treatment programs. 9 9 Second, it breathes important
life into the Congressional findings on questions of institutional
segregation, discrimination, and exclusion.2" Third, it specifically
focuses on the way that "unjustified isolation ... is properly regarded as
discrimination based on disability." '' Fourth, it comprehends how, in
its own words, the ADA had "stepped up" prior Congressional efforts in
this area.20 2 Fifth, it underscores how institutional isolation "perpetuates
unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable or
unworthy of participating in community life,"2 3 and how such isolation
"severely diminishes the everyday life activities of institutionalized
individuals."2°4
On the other hand, the Court's "qualifiers" are equally important. It
sanctions reliance on state professionals in determining community-
treatment eligibility, thus, implicitly endorsing a perpetuation of
Youngberg v. Romeo's "substantial professional judgment" standard,205
notwithstanding the fact that the Court had stressed that there was no
constitutional issue presented in the case.2° It emphasizes that Olmstead
cannot be read as an opinion designed to "phase out" institutions or to
move patients to inappropriate community settings. 20 7 Its "reasonable
modification" formula, by which a state must be able to "demonstrate
that it had a comprehensive, effectively working plan for placing
197. Id. at 2199.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 2176.
200. See id. at 2181.
201. Id. at 2185.
202. Id. at 2186.
203. Id. at 2187.
204. Id.
205. See supra text accompanying note 109.
206. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2181.
207. Id. at 2189.
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qualified persons with mental disabilities in less restrictive settings[,]"2"8
provides an early partial blueprint for the resolution of similar future
litigation.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence may turn out to be of critical
importance for several reasons. First, he focuses squarely on the specter
of inappropriate deinstitutionalization, relying on Fuller Torrey's
powerful critique."' Second, he raises the concern that the fear of
litigation may lead the state to prematurely and inappropriately release
patients "with too little assistance and supervision."2 ' Finally, he links
institutional release with patients' subsequent failure to self-medicate in
community settings, an argument that resonates in the current debate
over involuntary outpatient commitment laws that premise community
treatment on medication compliance. t ' It can be expected that these
arguments of Justice Kennedy's will be as much a factor in the
subsequent debate on community treatment questions as will Justice
Ginsburg's majority opinion.
In short, Olmstead has the capacity to be a truly transformative ADA
case, and one which may serve as the template for future developments
in this area.212  Although the Youngberg "substantial professional
judgment" standard has been an important underpinning of mental
disability law jurisprudence for nearly two decades, courts have rarely
given much thought to its dimensions, its limits, and its implications for
208. Id.
209. To my mind, Torrey's critique is a terribly flawed one. See Perlin, supra note 66, at
87. See generally Michael L. Perlin et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Mentally Disabled Persons: Hopeless Oxymoron or Path to Redemption?, I
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 80, 84-118 (1995).
210. Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2191. On the impact of"litigaphobia" (fear of litigation) on
mental disability law jurisprudence, see, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Tarasoffand the Dilemma of
the Dangerous Patient: New Directions for the 1990s, 16 LAw & PsYCHOL. REv. 29, 61-62
(1992).
211. See I PERLIN, supra note 9, § 2C-7.3, at 491-99 (2d ed. 1998).
212. See Perlin, Promises, supranote 31. Olmstead has been cited sparingly in the months
since it was decided; Rodriguez v. City of New York, 197 F.3d 611, 618-19 (2d Cir. 1999)
(distinguishing Olmstead in a case holding that state's implementation of certain programs used
to determine number of personal-care service hours to which persons with disabilities are
entitled did not violate the ADA); Dare v. State of California, 191 F.3d 1167, 1176 n.7 (9th Cir.
1999) (referring to Olmstead's characterization of "unjustified isolation" as "discrimination
based on disability," and to it having spoken "approvingly" of the ADA's efforts to end that
isolation.in a disability parking sticker case); Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1016
n.24 (8th Cir. 1999), cert granted in part, Alsbrook v. Arkansas, 120 S. Ct. 1003 (2000), cert.
dismissed, 120 S. Ct. 1265 (2000) (relying on Olmstead's interpretation of the meaning of
"reasonable modifications" in an I th Amendment case).
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institutional life.213 Olmstead's implicit endorsement of the standard is
likely to rekindle interest in this standard. This will clearly have an
impact on all aspects of institutional mental health practice. The Court's
focus on institutional segregation and the deleterious effects of
institutional isolation will likely lead to greater attention being paid to
the way institutions are run, and the ways institutional mental health
professionals provide treatment in institutional settings. If Olmstead
leads to more ADA litigation on behalf of institutionalized persons
seeking community treatment, it is likely that, notwithstanding the
cases's implicit endorsement of the Youngberg standard, this will also
lead to far greater scrutiny of mental health professionals' institutional
practices. Although Olmstead deals solely with civil patients, there is
nothing in the opinion or the ADA or the supporting regulations that
suggests that the basic principles would be inapplicable to forensic
populations.2"4
III. SANISM, PRETEXTUALITY, AND THE ADA215
Any analysis of ADA developments must be undertaken contextually
in light of the role of sanism and pretextuality. The "direct threat"
language in the ADA216 is a potential laboratory for sanist and pretextual
experimentation.217 What sort of "behavior" will allegedly pose such a
threat? If an employee starts to discuss obscure political conspiracies,
is that a threat? If an individual taking psychotropic medication
develops side effects that creates an agitated or a "zombie-like"
condition, is that a threat? If an employee appears to be fixated with,
213. See I PERLIN, supra note 9, §§ 3A-12 to 12.3 (2d ed. 1998); see also Michael L.
Perlin, "Their Promises of Paradise:" Will Olmstead v. L.C. Resuscitate the Constitutional
"Least Restrictive Alternative" Principle in Mental Disability Law? (work in progress, on file
with author).
214. See Michael L. Perlin, "For the Misdemeanor Outlaw:" The Impact of the ADA on
the Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Alabama Law Review).
215. This section of the article and the accompanying footnotes were developed from
Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can Sanist Attitudes Be
Undone?, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 15, 29-43 (1993-94); Michael L. Perlin, "Half-Wracked Prejudice
Leaped Forth:" Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental Disability Law Developed
As It Did, 10 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 3, 4-5; Michael L. Perlin, "Make Promises by the
Hour: " Sex, Drugs, the ADA, and Psychiatric Hospitalization, 46 DEPAuL L. REv. 947, 976-82
(1997).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
217. See EEOC v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 917 F. Supp. 419,431-32 (W.D. Va. 1996) (stating
that firing an employee due to timing of his epileptic seizures was not "unlawful
discrimination" under ADA).
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say, frogs or turtles, and talks to customers about their importance to the
world, is that a threat? To what extent can we expect that employers will
tolerate21 1 "aberrant" behavior on the part of workers? Let one local
news station pick up a story that a group of schoolchildren stopped going
to a downtown luncheonette because an employee was "acting odd," and
that anecdote will become the centerpiece of the next debate on
amending the ADA.
If the plain language of the ADA conflicts with what trial judges
think is "best" for mentally disabled persons, will judges enter pretextual
decisions (and encourage pretextual testimony)? Michael Saks reported
a trial judge's explanation as to why he ordered civil commitment of
individuals notwithstanding his overt acknowledgment that the state
failed to meet its burden of proof; and the judge did so because he felt
compelled "to do what [he thought was] right. '219 Should we expect
judges to be less pretextual in ADA decisionmaking? 2 1
Interestingly, in at least one section, the ADA drafters seem to
acknowledge the dangers of pretexts. While the Act explicitly does not
restrict the ability of insurance companies to limit mental-illness-
disability benefits, 22' it specifies that this non-restriction section may not
be used as a "subterfuge" to evade the purposes of either the employment
or public accommodations titles.222 This expectation of pretextual
218. 1 use this word consciously. It is impossible to assess the ADA's ultimate impact
without some consideration of the value of "tolerance." See, e.g., Martha Minow, Putting Up
and Putting Down: Tolerance Reconsidered, 28 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 409 (1990); Steven D.
Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CAL. L. REV. 305 (1990).
219. Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Sanism, Social Science, and the
Development of Mental Disability Law Jurisprudence, I 1 BEHAv. SCI. & L. 47, 54 n.47 (1993)
(discussing Michael Saks, Expert Witnesses, Nonexpert Witnesses, and Nonwitness Experts, 14
LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 291, 293 (1990)).
220. See Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir. 1996), reh'g.
denied (1996) (discussing disabilities that are not "open, obvious, and apparent"); see also Julie
Odegard, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Creating "Family Values" for Physically
Disabled Parents, I I LAW& INEQ. J. 533 (1993) (discussing discrimination against parents with
physical disabilities by both state support policies and the court system).
221. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12 201(cXl) (West 1995); see also Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1084 (1998) (stating that the ADA's
prohibition against disability discrimination in public accommodations did not prohibit an
employer from providing a long-term disability plan which contained longer benefits for
employees who become disabled due to physical illness than for those who become disabled due
to mental illness).
222. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12201(c). See generally Christopher Jones, Legislative
"Subterfuge?: " Failing to Insure Persons with Mental Illness Under the Mental Health Parity
Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 50 VAND. L. REv. 753 (1997) (discussing the lack
of protection for the mentally ill under the Mental Health Parity Act (MHPA) and the ADA
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behavior on the part of an industry subject to regulation under this act is
both realistic and troubling', for it reflects the extent to which pretexts
can color the way we treat persons with mental disabilities.
The potential superimposition of "morality" was raised explicitly in
the floor debate on the ADA by Senator Jesse Helms. His revealing
comment, asking about the consequences if an employer's "moral
standards" prevent him from hiring a manic-depressive, 223 reflects the
reality that sanist behavior may be seen as moral behavior.2 4 Will this
lead to a spate of literature suggesting that the ADA be subverted in the
same way that psychiatrists have written articles suggesting that strict
involuntary civil commitment laws be subverted?225
I believe that one of the many reasons why society reacts in different
ways toward persons with mental disabilities than it does when it
discriminates against other minorities is that the distinguishing
from private insurance limitations for mental health care); and Ramage, supra note 79, at 969-
70.
223. See Perlin, ADA, supra note 31, at 27-28.
224. See Deborah K. Dallmann, The Lay View of What "Disability" Means Must Give Way
to What Congress Says It Means: Infertility as a "Disability" Under The Americans With
Disabilities Act, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371 (1996) (discussing factual backdrop of Pacourek
v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Ill. 1994)):
Ms. Pacourek alleged that in 1992, an Inland manager, Thomas Wides, "verbally abused
[her] concerning her pregnancy related condition by expressing doubt as to her ability
to become pregnant and her ability to combine pregnancy and her career." She claimed
that she was "treated like she had an infectious disease" and that one top-level manager
told her, "I don't give a damn about the law. I only care about Inland Steel. If God had
wanted you to have children, . . . he would have given them to you."
Id. at 394-95 (footnotes omitted).
225. See I Perlin, supra note 9, § 2A-7. I, at 186-88 (2d ed. 1998) (citing and discussing,
inter alia, Paul Chodoff, The Case for Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally 11, 133 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 496, 501 (1976); Paul Chodoff, Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill
as a Moral Issue, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 384, 388 (1984); William McCormick, Involuntary
Commitment in Ontario: Some Barriers to the Provision of Proper Care, 124 CAN. MED.
ASS'N J. 715, 717 (1981)).
On efforts to limit the ADA's protections to the "truly disabled," compare Overton v.
Tar Heel Farm Credit, 942 F. Supp. 1066, 1068 (E.D. N.C. 1996) (relying on the language of
Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986), a pre-ADA case), with Robert Hammel,
Some Reflections on New York City's Disability Law, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1195, 1216 (1996)
(local human rights law should be limited to protect only the "seriously disabled"). Hammel
is responded to carefully, thoughtfully, and persuasively in Janet Eriv, Persistent
Misconceptions: A Response to Robert Hammel, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1219 (1996). The
Supreme Court has recently narrowed the universe of individuals who come within ADA
protections. See generally supra note 46 (discussing Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. 119 S. Ct.
2139 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999); Albertsons, Inc.
v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999)).
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characteristics of the latter groups are frequently immutable.226 With rare
exceptions, few people change gender or change race. When individuals
change religion, it is generally a voluntary act undertaken with some
knowledge of the dimensions and consequences of the decision. On the
other hand, each one of us can become mentally ill (and none of us
chooses it volitionally). This phenomenon may help explain the level of
virulence we often show toward persons with mental disabilities.227
The ADA floor debate on this question of what I will call the non-
immutability of mental illness was illuminating. Senator Armstrong
made this point graphically in his arguments on behalf of a narrowed
law:
A person is or is not a man or a woman. A person is or is not a
Catholic, a Jew, a Mormon, whatever .... That is something we can
readily determine. A person either is or is not Irish, Italian and so on.
This bill proceeds from an entirely different point of view ......
On the other hand, Senator Domenici, a co-sponsor and ardent
supporter, used the same information in an entirely different context.
Said Domenici:
It is very simple to say that it is only a matter of sex discrimination and
perhaps race, and perhaps religion, as some have suggested. Those are
easy ones.
But they just scratch the surface in terms of the suffering that goes on
in the lives of people who are assumed disabled because of some of the
niches that they are put in, especially when it comes to serious mental
illness .... 229
Our discomfort and lack of clarity as to who exactly is disabled and
who is not is, at base, sanist. Just as we wish to be able to categorize
226. Compare United States v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 128, 134-35 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.)
(rejecting immutability argument in equal protection challenge to constitutionality of post-
insanity acquittal commitment statute), with James Wilson, Constraints of Power: The
Constitutional Opinions of Judges Scalia, Bor, Posner, Easterbrook and Winter, 40 U. Mm
L. REv. 1171, 1198-99 (1986).
227. For a general discussion on the way that public fears about the purported link between
mental illness and dangerousness "drive the formal laws and policies governing mental
disability jurisprudence," see John Monahan, Mental Disorder and Violent Behavior:
Perceptions and Evidence, 47 Am. PsYcHoL. 511, 511 (1992); see also Allan H. Macurdy, The
Americans With Disabilities Act: Time For Celebration, or Time for Caution?, 1 PUB. INT'L.
L. J. 21, 32-34 (1991) (discussing the ways that stereotypes pervade our views of persons with
disabilities).
228. 135 CONG. REc. 19871 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Senator Armstrong),
available in WESTLAW, at 64.
229. Id. at 19878 (remarks of Senator Domenici).
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individuals in the criminal law as sane or insane, competent or
incompetent," we wish for a "real world" without tinges and shades of
gray, especially on the question of who is "mentally disabled" for
purposes of an act such as the ADA.
The ADA, if enforced, forces us to abandon sanist stereotypes in this
area of the law."' It makes us reject presumptions of incompetence,
broadly-drawn, non-individualized pictures of mentally disabled persons,
and policy rationales that are premised on prejudice and bias. The ADA,
if enforced, gives institutional plaintiffs a litigational vehicle to bring
some coherence to the state/federal morass in right-to-refuse-treatment
law and to seek to force courts to confront issues about personal
autonomy and sexuality that judges have been all too happy to avoid for
years.
Olmstead provides some powerful anti-sanist ammunition. Its
focuses on the ravages of isolation (and its linkage of that isolation to the
perpetuation of stereotypes, stigma and the diminution of everyday life)
is the Supreme Court's strongest language yet in a majority opinion that
implicitly acknowledges the corrosive impact of sanist behavior. On the
other hand, there may be reason for concern in Olmstead's willingness
230. For illustrative cases, compare Koehler v. State, 830 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. App. 1992),
reh 'g denied (1992) (being determined incompetent to manage one's own affairs not a prima
facie showing of incompetency to stand trial), with Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting):
But the majority cannot isolate the term "competent" and apply it in a vacuum,
divorced from its specific context. A person who is "competent" to play basketball is not
thereby "competent" to play the violin. The majority's monolithic approach to
competency is true to neither life nor the law. Competency for one purpose does not
necessarily translate to competency for another purpose.
Id. at 413.
On the multiple meanings of competency, see generally Michael L. Perlin, "The
Borderline Which Separated You From Me:" The Insanity Defense, the Authoritarian
Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1375, 1378-
97 (1997); Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization: A
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Zinermon v. Burch, in ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE 83, 102-05 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds. 1991).
231. See, e.g., PETER BLANCK, THE AMlERICANS WrM DISABILITIES ACr AND THE EMERGING
WORKFORCE: EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL RETARDATION 59-60 (1998); Peter David
Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Attitudes, Behavior and the Employment Provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REv. 345, 391-92 (1997); Peter David Blanck,
Civil Rights, Learning Disability, and Academic Standards, 2 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 33, 53-
54 (1998); Peter David Blanck, Students with Learning Disabilities, Reasonable
Accommodations, and the Rights of Colleges and Universities to Establish and Enforce
Academic Standards: Guckenberger v. Boston University, 21 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY
L. REP. 679, 684 (1997) (linking sanism to ADA inquiries).
[Vol. 17:1
OLMSTEAD v.L. C.
to be deferent to institutional professionals. 2 2  The history of
institutional treatment of persons with mental disabilities is, to be
charitable, a checkered one.2 ' By no means is it at all clear that the
"shock the conscience" scenarios uncovered in cases ranging from Wyatt
v. Stickne 34 to Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital23 - are
all mere historical artifacts.236 The potential for pretexts here is real and
is worthy of careful scrutiny in the next inevitable generation of
Olmstead-like cases.
At least three other concerns flow from the other Olmstead opinions.
As I have already suggested, Justice Kennedy's endorsement of Torrey's
florid description of deinstitutionalization as a "Titanic-like" disaster 237
may (perhaps unwittingly) serve to frame the continuing debate as to the
success and failures of differing approaches to deinstitutionalization.
The pages of journals such as American Psychologist or Psychiatric
Services are regularly filled with reports of successful
deinstitutionalization programs that have "worked," 238 and Torrey's vivid
heuristics should not serve to preempt the terms of this important
debate.239
Next, Justice Kennedy's connection between deinstitutionalization
and refusals to take medication is perplexing on two independent levels.
Concurring in 1992 in Riggins v. Nevada,240 Justice Kennedy wrote
eloquently about the dangers of drug side effects, dangers that so worried
him that he concluded he would not allow the use of antipsychotic
medications to make a defendant competent to stand trial absent an
"extraordinary showing," a showing he doubted was possible to make
232. See Olnstead v. L.C., 119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999). It is not at all clear how it is to be
determined if the judgment is reflective of "reasonable assessments of [the State's] own
professionals ...." Id. at 2188.
233. See, e.g., 2 PERLIN, supra note 9, § 3A (2d ed. 1999).
234. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). See generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 9, §§ 3A-3.1
(2d ed. 1999).
235. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977). See generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 9, §§ 7.10-
7.12 (2d ed. 1999).
236. See generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 9, § 3A-3.1, at 24 n.152 (2d ed. 1999) (stating that
the defendants were still not in compliance with certain aspects of Wyatt orders after 25 years).
E.g., Wyatt v. Rogers, 985 F. Supp. 1356 (M.D. Ala. 1997); Wyatt v. Rogers, 1998 WL 862920
(M.D. Ala. 1998).
237. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2191.
238. See, e.g., PERLIN, supra note 9, § 7.02, at 108 n.26 (1999 Cum. Supp.).
239. See Michael L. Perlin, "The Executioner 's Face Is Always Well-Hidden:" The Role
of Counsel and the Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201, 231 (1996).
240. 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
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"given our present understanding of the properties of these drugs."241
None of these concerns is present in his Olmstead opinion. This is even
more surprising, given the attention paid by the Court to antipsychotic
drug side effects in Sutton v. United Air Lines.242 In Sutton (an opinion
joined by Justice Kennedy), the Court discussed, in dicta, the fact that
"antipsychotic drugs can cause a variety of adverse effects, including
neuroleptic malignant syndrome and painful seizures[.]"243 Again, there
is no reference to this in Justice Kennedy's Olmstead concurrence,
Finally, both Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas speculate as to the
possibility of state-motivated improper release due to a fear of litigation.
This assumes a major fact not in evidence: that competent, qualified
counsel is widely available to represent institutionalized persons in such
litigation.244 This fear, certainly related to the critique that has
scapegoated patients' rights lawyers as the villain in the
245deinstitutionalization movement, is a potentially pernicious one, and
must be carefully rebutted by responsible advocates who provide legal
services to persons with mental disabilities.
Olmstead was limited to the question of community-based
treatment.' 4 Its powerful language about institutional segregation,247 and
about the permanent and irreversible effects of stereotyping, 248 however,
goes far beyond the modest holding of the case. In acknowledging the
ways that institutional placement can "perpetuate unwarranted
241. Id. at 139; see also 2 PERLIN, supra note 9, § 3B-8.3, at 323-29 (2d ed. 1999).
242. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
243. Id. at 2147.
244. See Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel
in Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 39 (1992).
245. See Michael L. Perlin, Out of Bedlam: The Truth About Deinstitutionalization, 8 N.Y.
L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 557 (1990-91) (book review).
[N]urtured by radical psychiatrists (such as Thomas Szasz and R.D. Laing), spurred on
by politically-activist organizations pushing egalitarian social agendas (such as the
ACLU), a cadre of brilliant but diabolical patients' rights lawyers dazzled sympathetic
and out-of-touch judges with their legal legerdemain - abetted by wooly-headed social
theories, inapposite constitutional arguments, some oh-my-god worst-case anecdotes
about institutional conditions, and a smattering of "heartwarming successful
[deinstitutionalization] cases"- as a result of which courts entered orders "emptying out
the mental institutions" so that patients could "die with their rights on." When cynical
bureaucrats read the judicial handwriting on the hospital walls, they then joined the
stampede, and the hospitals were thus emptied. Ergo deinstitutionalization. Ergo
homelessness. Endgame.
Id. at 559-60.
246. See Olmstead v. L.C., 119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999).
247. See id. at 2185.
248. See id. at 2187.
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assumptions ' about persons with mental disabilities and the way that
such confinement can "diminish... the everyday life activities of [such]
individuals,"25 the Olmstead court acknowledges the hidden prejudice
that contaminates all mental disability law.2 ' The majority, for the first
time in United States Supreme Court history,252 raises and implicitly
confronts the issue of sanism. By acknowledging that the state needs to
maintain a "range of facilities, 253 it rejects rigid, all-or-nothing, dyadic
views of institutional/non-institutional life and of mental health/mental
illness.254  By its decision, it explicitly warns us of the danger of
stereotyping and implicitly of "slotting '25 (use of the typification
heuristic by which treating doctors slot "patients into certain categories
and prescribes a similar regimen for all").256  By considering the
corrosive effect of perpetuated assumptions, it reminds us, in the words
of Judge David Bazelon, to be vigilant about "overgeneraliz[ing] about
citizens whom it is easy to overgeneralize about." 25"
IV. CONCLUSION
Olmstead, to be sure, is not a "deinstitutionalization decision" and
cannot and should not be interpreted as supporting the proposition that
all inpatient institutions must be closed down."5 Cases such as Kathleen
S. v. Department of Public Welfare, 259 holding that a state's decision to
close a state hospital violated the ADA by depriving residents of their
249. Id.
250. Id. (emphasis added).
251. See generally PERLIN, supra note 1; Perlin, supra note 67 (explaining such topics as
sanism and pretextuality and the role they play in mental disability law).
252. See supra note 53 (discussing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S.
432 and explaining the various stances taken by the Justices).
253. Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2191.
254. See Perlin, supra note 230, at 1397.
255. See Michael L. Perlin, Power Imbalances in Therapeutic and Forensic Relationships,
9 BERAv. ScI. & L. 111, 125 n.112 (1991).
256. Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47
U. MIAMi L. REV. 625, 662 (1993).
257. David Bazelon, Institutionalization, Deinstitutionalization, and the Adversary Process,
75 COLUM. L. REV. 897, 909 (1975).
258. State hospital populations are far less now than they were ten, twenty, or thirty years
ago. See Linda S. Dakin, Homelessness: The Role of the Legal Profession in Finding Solutions
Through Litigation, 21 FAM. L.Q. 93, 104 (1987) (discussing a 70 percent decline in New York
from 1965 to 1982). Researchers have pointed out that, in some jurisdictions, when involuntary
civil commitment laws are loosened, the number of newly admitted patients increases
significantly.
259. 10 F. Supp.2d 460 (E.D. Pa. 1998), stay denied, 10 F. Supp.2d 476 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
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right to receive services in the most integrated setting appropriate to their
needs,2" will likely build on Olmstead and construe some of the
decision's more ambiguous language. One of the most intriguing, and
still unasked, questions is the extent to which Olmstead will eventually
be read as a therapeutic or antitherapeutic decision. This therapeutic
jurisprudence inquiry26 is beyond the scope of this paper, but cries out
for future analysis. I am convinced, however, that therapeutic
jurisprudence investigations are incomplete if they do not "factor in" the
impacts of sanism and pretextuality.262 Again, the Court's focus on
segregation and isolation forces us to consciously add these
considerations to our analysis. But what Olmstead does tell us though,
with finality, is that the Maggie's Farm mentality of the past is gone
forever.
The analogy to Maggie 's Farm, of course, is not a perfect one. No
one would characterize Olmstead, as the critic Tim Riley characterized
Maggie's Farm, as "the counterculture's war cry., 263 But the music
critic Andrew Muir's vision of Maggie's Farm, as "representing any
restricting, corrupt society or system," and a critique of the "personal
prisons we all create by denying the freedom of the individual, ' 26 may
be closer to the mark. In Olmstead, for the first time the Supreme Court
spoke of isolation and segregation and stereotypes and stigma. For this
Court at this point in time, those references were fairly revolutionary.
Only time will tell us the extent of Olmstead's true legacy.
260. There were three classes in the Kathleen S. case: residents who would be placed in the
community following closure, those who were suitable for community treatment but for whom
inadequate facilities existed, and those not appropriate for community placement.
261. See, e.g., BRUCE WINICK, THERAPEUTICJURISPRUDENCEAPPLIED: ESSAYS ON MENTAL
HEALTH LAW (1997); ESSAYS IN THEwrErc JURISPRUDENCE (David Wexler & Bruce Winick
eds. '199 1); LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE (David Wexler & Bruce Winick eds. 1996); THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE:
THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (David Wexler ed. 1990); ESSAYS, supra note 230; David
B. Wexler, Applying the Law Therapeutically, 5 APP'L. & PREVEN. PSYCHOL. 179 (1996); David
B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health Into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 16 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 27 (1992); David B. Wexler, Reflections on the Scope of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, I PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 220 (1995); Bibliography of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 915 (1993); 1 PERLIN, supra note 9, § 2D-3, at
534-41(2d ed. 1998).
262. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Understanding the Sanist and
Pretextual Bases of Mental Disability Law, 20 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 369
(1994); Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
University of Cincinnati Law Review).
263. RILEY, supra note 4, at 104.
264. Muir, supra note 1I.
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